The likelihood of a full-scale war between Russia and NATO countries is low, but Moscow is consistently carrying out hybrid operations against states that support Ukraine. Their main goal is to intimidate those countries and get them to scale back support for Kyiv.
Moscow cannot afford to directly attack infrastructure on the territory of North Atlantic Alliance states. Doing so would carry a high risk of a war for which the Russian side is not ready, given its commitment and losses in the conflict with Ukraine. It therefore seeks to influence the stance of countries backing Ukraine by other means: sabotage (arson, railway diversion and the like), as well as propaganda and disinformation operations through which it tries to sway public opinion in states that support Ukraine.
Russia’s main tool is intimidation. That explains actions such as airspace violations (affecting Poland, the Baltic states and Romania, each of which actively supports Kyiv), drone attacks directly at the Polish-Ukrainian border (at least three such incidents occurred this September near the Dorohusk-Jagodzin border crossing), and verbal threats of armed aggression, including the use of nuclear weapons, aimed at individual countries by Russian propaganda channels.
“Russia does not need to plan a full-scale war with Poland today to weaken our ability to support Ukraine and test NATO’s cohesion. In the Russian picture, Poland is a consistent adversary, but one operating within a network of dependencies. That is why pressure may be aimed not at changing our declared policy, but at the timing, cost and consistency of carrying it out,” wrote analyst and expert Lt. Col. (res.) Maciej Korowaj on his profile on X.
In this case, the actions in question are already under way. Their aim is not only to physically disrupt deliveries, which would require large forces and resources over a longer period, but also to create a situation in which carrying them out becomes harder amid shifting public sentiment. “I maintain that from Moscow’s perspective, it is possible to strike Ukrainian logistics so close to Poland that Warsaw also bears the cost of protecting its own space and sustaining deliveries. So that it has to react at a rhythm imposed by Moscow,” Korowaj said.
– In theory, military action cannot be completely ruled out, but the Russians would prefer to achieve their goals without resorting to it, using only propaganda and sub-threshold activity. The proof is the more than 140 different incidents that have occurred in European countries over the past year, Ołeksandr Chara, director of the Center for Defense Strategies in Kyiv, told PAP. In his assessment, intimidation is and will remain a key element of Russia’s actions toward countries that support Ukraine.
Russian efforts in the information sphere are also reinforced by statements from Russian officials that point, among other things, to violations of the rights of Russian-speaking populations in the Baltic states, such as Estonia. Although they are not a direct threat of armed force, that is precisely how they are being read, especially combined with reports of restricted movement in a strip of Russian territory along the Estonian border and with photos of Russian soldiers right at the border appearing on social media. Similar actions, though not acts of physical aggression, set off waves of speculation and fear of possible aggressive moves by Moscow.
– It is important for Russia to cut Ukraine off from external support by any means. The aim is to prevent Ukraine from receiving various types of weapons, especially cruise missiles, Ołeksij Jiżak, an analyst at Ukraine’s National Institute for Strategic Studies, explained to PAP. In his assessment, Russia fears deliveries of this kind of weaponry reaching Ukraine from the West. So although it cannot afford to take open military action against NATO countries, it is seeking, through hybrid methods, to trigger internal crises in Western countries that could translate into weaker support for Kyiv.
– This is happening through means such as social unrest linked to high prices, or influencing elections. The point is to amplify all the negative processes in Europe so that it becomes a less organized structure than Russia, the expert said.
The situation is further complicated by Russia’s current attacks on Ukraine’s energy infrastructure, which are becoming more frequent, as they usually do in the autumn and winter. An additional threat now is jet-powered drones, which are harder to shoot down. Ukraine also has seriously limited stocks of anti-aircraft missiles, especially for Patriot systems, which are the only ones able to counter Russian ballistic missiles. Under these conditions, support from Western countries, including Poland, remains a key factor in Ukraine’s ability to keep fighting.
– Among possible scenarios, one is that Ukrainian drones brought down in Russia by Russian electronic warfare units (EW – PAP) could be used for provocations in NATO countries, to create the impression that it is Kyiv that wants to drag them into the war, Chara predicts.
Another example could be actions such as the crash of a Ukrainian drone in Lithuania on October 18. Earlier, the drone had violated Polish airspace. That happened during an attack on oil facilities in Leningrad Oblast, probably as a result of Russian electronic warfare systems. In this case, the Russian propaganda and disinformation apparatus tried to prove that the Ukrainian side’s actions were deliberate, and even that NATO countries were knowingly involved in operations against Russia.
The level of preparedness of individual countries for such a possibility is of major importance to the actions Russia is, and will be, willing to take.
– Among the larger European NATO states, only Poland and Germany have seriously increased defense spending since 2022, Chara said. He added that, from the standpoint of the alliance’s eastern flank, the situation in the Baltic states could be particularly problematic because their small territory leaves them without strategic depth.
– However, NATO soldiers are stationed there and will act if necessary. I hope Putin will not do anything foolish, although of course there is some risk that he could misjudge the reaction of the West and NATO and do something that, from our perspective, would be irrational, the Ukrainian expert acknowledged. (PAP)
Dariusz Materniak (PAP)
